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This study tests the hypothesis that competition policy positively impacts a country’s 
production and export competitiveness. The results show that competition policy has a 
significantly positive impact on manufacturing production. The results also show that exports 
for both total manufacturing and food manufacturing are positively related to competition 
policy. 
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Introduction: 
Over the last 10 years or so, competition policy has emerged as a major issue for the 
international trade system. Competition policy, simply called competition law, is a set of 
rules and regulations a country’s government pursues to enhance market contestability 
(Hoekman and Mavriodis). It ensures market competition, protects against monopolies, and 
maintains sound economic development for the country. When a market exhibits some form 
of imperfection or monopolistic competition, governments establish competition laws to 
regulate economic activities in order to ensure that markets operate within the public interest 
(Kahyarara). According to the official OECD webpage, “Well-designed competition law, 
effective law enforcement and competition-based economic reform promote increased 
efficiency, economic growth and employment for the benefit of all.”
5 
While competition policy, in economic theory, acts as an efficiency-enhancing factor 
for economic development, the greater the intensity of competition policy the better the 
economic performance, many counties are still concerned  about competition in product 
market despite the absence of a formal competition policy. Especially in most developing 
countries, there is no competition policy. Instead governments in developing countries 
intervene from time to time if any anti-competitive behavior arises (Singh). Since the 
governments have control over market behavior and can fix prices, they have a tendency to 
avoid formal competition policy. However, most economists suggest that competition policy 
is essential for developing economies because they are increasingly subject to international 
competition due to trade liberalization and huge foreign merger movements in recent years 
                                                 
5 Source: http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_37463_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html   3 
(Singh). In developed countries, competition policy, though it has a wide range of variation 
from country to country, is an effective tool enhancing economic development. In some 
instances, it is forty per cent more effective than in developing countries (World Bank; cited 
in Singh). However, due to a lack of strong evidence, there is still considerable disagreement 
on the nature of competition in emerging markets, and on how intensively competition policy 
influences economic performance of the country. 
A number of empirical studies investigate the impacts of competition policy. Ahn 
reported that product market competition encourages productivity growth. Kee and Hoekman 
examined the impact of competition policy on profit margins and concluded that government 
policies to facilitate entry and exit of firms can have important effects on industry markups. 
Zhang et al. found that both regulation and competition introduced before privatization 
positively impact electricity generation. Another useful piece of evidence comes from an 
interesting study by Kahyarara that examined the role of competition policy in influencing 
productivity, investment and exports of Tanzanian manufacturing industries. His results 
suggest that the existence of competition policy positively impacts firm productivity, but the 
competition, when it is ranked as a production problem, negatively impacts productivity. He 
also found that competition policy has a positive impact on investment and export flows in 
the manufacturing enterprise. 
Although competition concerns have been around for many years, the formal 
discussion in WTO was launched in 1997 by establishing a Working Group on competition. 
The linkage between competition policy and trade has been a growing concern in the last 10 
years. There are a number of empirical works that establish the significance of within-firm 
impacts of competition policy but little attention has focused on the impact of competition   4 
policy for food manufacturing. Competition issues arise in the farm input sector with respect 
to the market structure of the seed and agro-chemicals industries. Competition issues are also 
present in the processing sector, particularly for fish and livestock industries. There is a need 
to assess how global agricultural markets could be better regulated with respect to 
competition policy. This study examines how competition policy impacts productivity 
growth and international competitiveness in the manufacturing industry paying special 
attention to processed food industries. The work is important and helps decision makers to 
measure the policy impacts of competition regulations. The literature is largely silent 
regarding its impact on food and processed food products both at the domestic and 
international levels. This study offers a unique opportunity to contribute to the existing 
literature. 
Research objectives: 
This study aims at developing a better understanding of competition policy and its impact 
on a country’s productivity growth and international trade flows: testing the hypothesis that 
competition policy positively impacts productivity growth as well as export competitiveness. 
The specific objectives of this study include: 
a.  To identify factors that influence productivity growth and trade competitiveness; 
b.  To develop a model to estimate the impact of competition policy on a country’s 
productivity growth and export flows in particular on agri-food processing; 
c.  To compare the policy impacts within manufacturing sectors. 
Literature Review: 
Competition policy concerns in national and global discussions have been around for 
many years. A number of empirical studies now exist on within-firm impacts of competition   5 
policy in the literature. However, the literature is largely silent regarding the impact of 
competition policy in the agri-food manufacturing. The reason behind this insufficient 
empirical study on competition policy is a shortage of reliable and adequate data. The 
situation has improved in recent years: some investigators have undertaken surveys to 
investigate the extent and impact of competition and competition policy. We analyze 
empirical studies, most of which suggest that competition policy is positively related to 
domestic production and international competitiveness. 
  Kahyarara investigated the impact of competition and competition policy on 
firm performance indicators of productivity, investments, and exports. He surveys the 
existence of competition within the line of a firm’s production in the Tanzanian 
manufacturing sectors, and investigates if competition is one of the biggest problems that 
affect firm performance. His empirical result suggests that the existence of competition 
positively impacts a firm’s productivity, but competition, when ranked as major production 
problem, negatively influences productivity growth of the firm. He also found competition 
policy has a positive impact on investments and exports in Tanzanian manufacturing sectors. 
Kee and Hoekman developed an empirical framework developed by Hall to estimate 
the impact of domestic and foreign competition on industry markups over time and across a 
large number of countries. They determined the relative impact of competition policy by 
using a dummy variable that equals 1 if the competition policy exists in a given year. For the 
empirical results, they did not find any significant impact of competition policy on industry 
markups. However, the results suggest that competition policy may impact the industry 
markups in the long run via its impact on domestic entry.   6 
Zhang et al. investigated the impact of competition and policy reforms in electricity 
generation. In their empirical study they added a competition dummy that equals 1 if a 
wholesale market for electricity is introduced, 0 otherwise. In their empirical study, they 
found that both regulation and competition introduced before privatization increase 
electricity availability and generation. 
Theoretical Model: 
To explore the impact of competition and competition policy on productivity growth 
and international competitiveness, the study uses the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
2 1 b b
it it it it L K A Q =                 (1) 
Where it assumes a firm produces output (Q) with a technology that uses capital (K) 
and labor (L) inputs in year t. A is an index of total factor productivity or a coefficient that 
represents the level of technology, and it increases marginal product of  all factors 
simultaneously.  1 b and  2 b are positive parameters satisfying  1 ; 0 ) , ( 2 1 2 1 = + > b b b b  that 
would imply constant return to scale. 
A competition policy variable can be incorporated in the production equation 
(Kahyarara). The idea behind this incorporation is to ensure that competition enhances 
market contestability: it leads to improve efficiency, lower prices and higher product quality. 
Besides that, competition brings wider economic benefits: if firms are efficient, their 
international competitiveness will improve, which causes a country’s exports to increase and 
imports to decline. 
To test the hypothesis that competition policy positively impacts productivity growth 
and export competitiveness, we incorporate competition policy in the production equation. 
The competition policy is used as a dummy variable (C), which equals 1 if competition   7 
policy exists in a given year. Including competition policy variable, the production equation 
has the following form: 
it C
it it it it e L K A Q
g b b 2 1 =               (2) 
Transforming the above equation (2) into logarithms allows linear estimation where 
the dependent variable is directly related to explanatory variables. Taking logs and appending 
an error term, we can write: 
it it it it it C L K Q m g b b + + + = ln ln ln 2 1         (3) 
where, we assume that the error term ( it m ) satisfies all assumption of the classical 
regression model. Given the above equation, we can calculate an OLS estimate for the error 
term it m , provided the coefficients are consistently estimated. But the problem is that the 
estimation suffers from simultaneity problems, which means that the regressors and the 
errors are correlated, and thus, this problem makes OLS estimates biased. In fact, in addition 
to the exogenous variables used in equation (3) there exist other exogenous factors that affect 
production. If these factors cause the error terms in the equation (3) to be correlated across all 
periods for particular country or among countries for a given period, simple OLS estimates 
that ignore these correlation will be inefficient. Fortunately, panel regression can solve this 
problem by adequately capturing both cross-sectional and time variations in the data. 
We can estimate panel regressions using two common techniques: Fixed effects 
model, and Random effects model. This classification depends upon alternative assumptions 
about error terms and about how the coefficients change over cross sections or time. In fixed 
effect models, differences over cross-sectional sectors are assumed to be reflected in the 
intercept term that accounts for time invariant attributes, while in random effects models, this 
attribute is divided into mean intercept and a group specific error and treated as a random   8 
variable in the model. These two models are again divided into two groups: (a) one way 
model that does not consider a time specific effect; and (b) two way model that includes the 
time specific effect. The assumptions underlying these estimates are somewhat restrictive. 
Given equation (3), the alternative models are: 
Fixed effects model: 
(a) One way model: 
it it it it i it C L K Q m g b b b + + + + = ln ln ln 2 1 0         (4) 
Where  i 0 b is an individual special attribute that is constant over time and  it m is a 
classic error term with  0 ) ( = it E m  and 
2 ) ( s m = it V . 
(b) Two way model: 
it it it it t i it C L K Q m g b b n b b + + + + + + = ln ln ln 2 1 0 0       (5) 
Where  i 0 b is a group effect and  t n is a time effect for each period. 
Random effect model: 
(a) One way model: 
it i it it it it u C L K Q m g b b b + + + + + = ln ln ln 2 1 0        (6) 
Where  0 b is a constant and  i u is an error characterizing the ith observation and 
constant over time, with   0 ) ( = i u E , and 
2 ) ( s = i u V , 0 ) ( = j iu u E for  j i ¹ , and 
0 ) , ( = it i u Cov m . 
(b) Two way model: 
t it i it it it it w u C L K Q + + + + + + = m g b b b ln ln ln 2 1 0       (7) 
Where  t w is an error reflecting the time effect for each period.   9 
Both the fixed and random effects models are recognized econometric techniques to 
solve simultaneity problems but each has its own caveats and can produce quite different 
results. The issue of preference of one over the other is highly arguable. In the fixed effects 
model, the unit-specific effect ( i 0 b ) is correlated with the other regressors, whereas the 
random effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. So the fixed effects model is 
substandard to the random effects model in terms of degrees of freedom. (Greene). 
Empirical Model: 
Given the framework discussed in the previous section (Equations (4), (5), (6) and 
(7)), the study explores the impact of competition policy on a country’s manufacturing 
production and exports, including production and exports in the food and food product 
industries. The study develops the following regression equations: 
it it it
S









   (For manufacturing production)    (8) 
it it it
S









   (For manufacturing exports)      (9) 
where, the MP represents gross output in the manufacturing industry of a country and 
MX is exports in manufacturing sectors of  the country. The dependent variable of the above 
equations is determined by the explanatory variable E that includes gross fixed capital 
formation (K), labor force (L) and import penetration (M); C denotes competition policy used 
as a dummy variable, which equals 1 if competition policy exists in a given year; m are error 
terms; s is the sector, either total manufacturing or manufacturing for food and food products; 
i represents country, and t is time (1980-2003). In these econometric equations, the signs 
above the explanatory variables are the expected direction of their impact on output 
production and export flows. It is expected that factor inputs (capital and labor) positively or   10 
negatively impact both production and exports. According to Kee and Hoekman, the import 
penetration is negatively related to production and exports. This study adds this variable in 
both regression equations to see its relationship with production and export flows. The 
relationship between import penetration and production and exports is expected to be 
negative. The sign for competition policy indicates that there is a positive relationship 
between competition policy and a firm’s production as well as exports. If a country 
introduces competition policy, it is expected that the competition policy enhances 
competitions among firms (both domestic and foreign), and thus increases production of the 
firm and exports. 
In order to examine the relationship between competition policy and a country’s 
manufacturing production and exports, we employ all the four panel models, fixed effects 
one way (FIXONE), fixed effects two way (FIXTWO), randon effect one way (RANONE), 
and random effects two way (RANTWO) models discussed in the previous section. The 
functional forms of the model for manufacturing production and exports are as follows: 
For manufacturing production: 
FIXONE:  it it it it it i
S
it C M L K MP m g b b b b + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln     (10) 
FIXTWO:  it it it it it t i
S
it C M L K MP m g b b b n b b + + + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 0 ln ln ln   (11) 
RANONE:  it i it it it it
S
it u M C L K MP m b g b b b + + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln   (12) 
RANTWO:  t it i it it it it
S
it w u M C L K MP + + + + + + + = m b g b b b 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln   (13) 
For manufacturing exports: 
FIXONE:  it it it it it i
S
it C M L K MX m g b b b b + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln     (14)   11 
FIXTWO:  it it it it it t i
S
it C M L K MX m g b b b n b b + + + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 0 ln ln ln   (15) 
RANONE:  it i it it it it
S
it u M C L K MX m b g b b b + + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln   (16) 
RANTWO:  t it i it it it it
S
it w u M C L K MX + + + + + + + = m b g b b b 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln  (17) 
 
Data sources and description: 
The country panel data utilized in this model are collected for twenty four years, 
1980-2003, on OECD countries. Data for all variables come from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and OECD STAN Database. 
Total manufacturing is the production of total manufacturing industries in each 
country, and food manufacturing is the total production of food products, beverages and 
tobacco in each country. Annual data for total manufacturing for 20 countries (Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and 
the United States), and the data for food manufacturing for 11 countries (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
States) are collected from OECD STAN Database for Industrial Analysis. Annual data for 
total export of goods in manufacturing industries, and data for exports of goods in food 
products, beverages and tobacco sectors are also collected from OECD STAN Database for 
Industrial Analysis.  
The import penetration for total manufacturing and manufacturing exports are 
calculated as the values of imports as a percentage of total production. Import penetration for 
food products, beverages and tobacco are collected directly from the OECD STAN Database 
for Industrial Analysis. Capital is the gross capital formation (Constant 200 US$) for total   12 
manufacturing and manufacturing exports, and labor is the total labor force for total 
manufacturing and manufacturing exports; both of the data set were collected from World 
Development Indicator (WDI). But the capital for food manufacturing and food 
manufacturing exports is the gross capital formation collected from OECD STAN Database 
for Industrial Analysis. The labor for food manufacturing and food manufacturing exports is 
only skilled labor, which is calculated by the formula developed by Branson and Monoyios, 
and collected from OECD STAN Database for Industrial Analysis. The competition policy 
variable is used as a dummy variable in this study, which equals 1 if competition policy 
exists in a given year. The data for the adoption year of competition policy for 20 countries 
are collected from Kee and Hoekman. 
Empirical results: 
The study hypothesizes that a country’s production and export competitiveness are positively 
related to competition policy. We used aggregate data for countries’ total manufacturing sectors to 
regress a competition policy variable with control variables such as capital stock, labor force and 
import penetration on manufacturing production and exports. Since the impact of competition 
regulation depends upon the particular circumstances of the industry to which the policy is applied, 
we examine how competition policy impacts production and exports of a specific sector, in 
particular the agri-food processing sector. We estimated equations with a panel regression model for 
twenty four years for the period 1980 to 2003 with the full sample of 20 OECD countries for total 
manufacturing industries and 11 OECD countries for food manufacturing.  
The estimation results using the fixed effects and the random effects model are 
reported in four different tables (Table 1-4). The F values for all regression equations are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The R
2 values indicate that the overall goodness of fit   13 
of the regressions is quite good. According to the test statistics, F values for all fixed effects 
models are significant at the 1% level. The F test compares the pooled OLS and fixed effects 
model. Hence, the F statistics rejects the null hypothesis that all dummy parameters (country 
and/ or year) except one are zero. We may conclude that the fixed effects model is better than 
the pooled OLS model (we present and discuss the preferred model). 
To compare a fixed effects and a random effects model, Hausman specification (HS) 
test is the classical test. This test compares the fixed effects and random effects model under 
the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the 
model. If there is such correlation (the null hypothesis is rejected), the random effects model 
would be inconsistently estimated and the fixed effects model would be the model of choice. 
As shown in the results, the Hausman statistic is high enough to reject the null hypothesis so 
we adopt the estimates of the fixed effects model. In fact, there are no big differences 
between fixed effects and random effects models. 
Table 1 displays the regression analyses for production of countries’ total 
manufacturing, and the estimators of the fixed effect models (Equation 10 & 11) are 
presented in column 2 and 3. The results show that the policy variable has a significantly 
positive coefficient as expected in the regression model (Equation (10)): a competition policy 
leads to an increase in the manufacturing production by 35 percent. This result suggests that 
competition policy enhances competition by reducing entry barriers, and makes a favorable 
endowment shock that may cause firms to produce more output with lower prices. The 
coefficient value on the import penetration is negatively related to the countries’ total 
manufacturing output, and the result implies that 0.38 per cent decrease in import penetration 
results in a one per cent increase in total output production in the total manufacturing sectors.   14 
That is, increased production of a good may satisfy the domestic demand of that good, and as 
a result, the import demand of that good may decline. The results also show that the 
coefficient for labor is positively related to manufacturing production, but the coefficient of 
capital is not statistically different from zero. The policy variable has a significantly positive 
coefficient for the two way model (Equation (11): competition policy leads to an increase in 
manufacturing production by 10 per cent as expected. 
Table 1: Regression results of total manufacturing production in OECD countries, 1980-03 
Variables  Fixed Effects Model  Random Effects Model 
  One Way  Two Way  One Way  Two Way 


































































R2  0.93  0.96     
F  280.02 
a  167.19 
a     
HS      510.88 




b indicate significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. All the variables except competition policy are in logs. 
 
Estimated results for Equation (14) and Equation (15), presented in Table 2, show 
that the existence of competition policy for the one way model has a significantly positive 
impact on manufacturing export: competition policy leads to an increase in manufacturing 
exports by 137 per cent. This result is consistent with the finding with Kahyarara. Both 
coefficients of capital and labor have positive signs, and are statistically significant at the 1%   15 
level: a 1 per cent increase in capital and labor leads to an increase in total manufacturing 
exports by 1.1 and 2.8 per cent, respectively. The import penetration coefficient is 
statistically significant at 1% level, and negatively related to the manufacturing export. The 
relationship between competition policy and manufacturing exports is also significantly 
positive in the two way model presented in column 3. 
Table 2: Regression results of total manufacturing exports in OECD countries for 1980-03 
Variables  Fixed Effects Model  Random Effects Model 
  One Way  Two Way  One Way  Two Way 


































































R2  0.88  0.92     
F  141.32 
a  91.16 
a     
HS      82.94 




b indicate significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. All the variables except competition policy are in logs. 
 
Table 3 displays the estimated results of food manufacturing production that is 
explained by competition policy with other variables used in the model (Equation 10-13). In 
column 2 and column 3, we interact countries food manufacturing production with 
competition dummies using one way and two way models. It is shown that the parameter 
estimates on the policy variable are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for 
both the regressions. In the one way model, the results suggest that food manufacturing   16 
production in the post-competition policy period is about 31 per cent higher than the export 
in the pre-competition period. This positive sign implies that the production for food 
manufacturing is higher when competition policy is introduced than the production when 
competition policy is not introduced. 
Table 3: Regression results of food manufacturing production in OECD countries, 1980-03 
Variables  Fixed Effects Model  Random Effects Model 
  One Way  Two Way  One Way  Two Way 

































































R2  0.98  0.98     
F  21.07 
a  9.02 
a     
HS      7.43 




b indicate significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. All the variables except competition policy are in logs. 
 
The results also show that the coefficients of capital and labor are 0.40 and 0.17, 
respectively, and significantly positive at 1% level. The coefficient of import penetration 
(0.16) is significant at the 1% level and has a positive sign. This positive sign for import 
penetration is unexpected and difficult to explain in the one way model. Competition policy 
is positively correlated to food manufacturing production: the estimated coefficient of 
competition policy implies that the production increases almost 29 per cent   in the two way 
when competition policy exists.   17 
Table 4 shows the regression analyses (Equation 14-17) for countries’ food 
manufacturing exports as influenced by competition policy with other factor variables. 
Table 4: Regression results of food manufacturing exports in OECD countries for 1980-03 
Variables  Fixed Effects Model  Random Effects Model 
  One Way  Two Way  One Way  Two Way 



































































R2  0.99  0.99     
F value  110.82  43.71     
HS      8.95  22.01 
Notes: 
a and 
b indicate significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. All the variables except competition policy are in logs. 
 
As shown in the one way model, the coefficient of competition has a positive sign and 
is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that food manufacturing export in the post-
competition policy period is about 69 per cent higher than the export in the pre-competition 
period. Kahyarara investigated the competition policy impact on exports but he finds positive 
policy impacts on exports but the results are not statistically significant. The coefficient of 
import penetration for the exports in the food manufacturing sector is significantly positive at 
the 1% level. This result of a positive sign is difficult to explain conceptually. The 
coefficients of capital and labor are significantly positive for food manufacturing exports: a 1 
per cent increase in capital and labor results in an increase in food manufacturing exports by   18 
0.45 and 0.09 per cent, respectively. In the two way model, the policy variable has a 
significantly positive sign: competition policy leads to an increase in food manufacturing 
exports by 65 per cent.  
Conclusion: 
The pupose of this study is to examine the impact of competition policy on a 
country’s production and export competitiveness. We derive our empirical regression model 
from a Cobb Douglas production function that considers that production and exports are 
influenced by competition policy along with factors endowments.  We hypothesise that 
competition policy is positively related to a country’s production and export flows. With the 
framework, we tested these hypotheses using panel data for total manufacturing and food 
manufacturing for 20 countries during 1980-2003. We employ fixed effects and random 
effects models in our regression analyses. Since the impact of competition regulation 
depends upon the particular circumstances of the industry to which the policy is applied, we 
examine how competition policy impacts productivity growth and exports of a specific sector 
in particular in the agri-food processing sector. 
The results show that existence of competition policy has a significantly positive 
impact on manufacturing production. The food manufacturing production is higher when 
competition policy is introduced than the export when competition policy is not introduced. 
This result suggests that competition policy enhances competition by reducing entry barrier. 
The results also show that exports for both total manufacturing and food manufacturing are 
positively related to competition policy: in both cases exports in the post-competition policy 
period is higher than the export in the pre-competition period. So competition policy 
enhances productivity growth as well as leads to an increase in export flows. The increased   19 
production caused by competition policy decreases the import demand of the firm, and thus, 
the country’s import flows decline in the post competition policy period. 
In this study, we had difficulties in finding reliable data for the competition policy 
variable. We are not confident enough about the impact of the competition policy because we 
use a dummy variable for this policy variable in our regression analyses. The major difficulty 
lies in trying to measure the exact influences that a policy imposes on manufactures. Many 
efficiency-enhancing factors that the firm might have along with competition policy factors 
may influence a country’s production and exports. It would be very difficult to separate 
competition policy’s impact from other factors that explain the firm’s performance.  
Moreover, we use aggregate data for both manufacturing production and exports but the 
impact of competition regulation exclusively depends upon the particular circumstances of 
the industry to which the policy is applied. So, we recommend further research be focused on 
the harmonization of competition policy, factor intensity, and relative factor abundances of 
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